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THE REGULATION OF SHORT
SALES AND ITS REFORM
EMILIOS AVGOULEAS*
Introduction
Short selling has long been regarded as an extreme
form of “casino capitalism” that destabilises financial
markets, raising also concerns regarding their moral
foundations. Hostility against short selling gathered
unstoppable momentum in September 2008 in the
middle of the market price collapse of financial sec-
tor stocks. Short sales were seen as the principal
cause of those precipitous falls. As a result, most
developed market regulators declared a ban on short
sales in financial sector stocks.
However, a large number of empirical studies indi-
cate that short sales are, in fact, a beneficial source of
market efficiency. This view has been confirmed by
studies on the September 2008 ban, which show that
the prohibition did not yield any concrete benefits,
especially in terms of reduction of price volatility. On
the contrary, it had an adverse impact on liquidity.
The market abuse rationale, offered as the main jus-
tification for the September 2008 ban, was also un-
convincing. Furthermore, US and European regula-
tory orders banning short sales revealed how dis-
parate are the regimes governing cross-border secu-
rities trading.
This article argues that the best way to regulate short
sales is through a dual strategy of disclosure and
short trading halts, rather than a prohibition or an
uptick rule. The short trading halts should be based
on a sophisticated circuit breaker system that is
focused on short and medium term market condi-
tions and preserves the proper function of the price
formation mechanism. Disclosure and short trading
halts should be complemented by a strict settlement
regime, which would eliminate the scope for aggres-
sive speculation through uncovered positions.
What’s the matter with short sales?
A broad definition of short sales would describe
them as sales of securities which the seller does not
own.1 Normally, the seller has borrowed the securi-
ties concerned and engages in relevant transactions
against a commitment to buy the securities back later
at a lower price, returning also any borrowed shares
to the lender.
Short selling often appears as a risk free bet that
destabilises financial markets. Thus, it is viewed by
the public and the press as an extreme form of spec-
ulation associated with the dark side of financial cap-
italism. The fact that hedge funds are among the
most aggressive short sellers only helps to reinforce
this view, which was shared, at the height of the cri-
sis, by regulators, policy makers, and senior bank
executives.
Furthermore, selling something that the trader does
not own on the spot market goes counter to one of
the deepest rooted traditions of western (free-mar-
ket) economies, namely that parties in spot asset
markets entering for profit in any kind of economic
exchange must have property rights, probably title,
of some form over the traded asset. This is normally
not the case with short sales, at least, with “naked”
short sales. 2
Apart from moral concerns, the main economic
issues arising from short selling is the ability of this
practice to destabilise orderly markets and increase
market volatility. This becomes a very serious prob-
lem when short selling pushes prices further down-
wards in a falling market, a so-called “bear raid”. In
a market where some traders are rational and some
irrational (Shleifer and Summers 1990), a “bear
raid” may trigger a precipitous fall that is not justi-
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1 For an extensive definition, see IOSCO (2009, Appendix III, 24).
2 “Naked short sales” is a term used to describe transactions in
securities the seller does not hold at all.
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fied by both inside and publicly available informa-
tion and is primarily caused by investor sentiment:
commonly called “animal spirits” of the market.3
Another very important concern is the possibility to
use short sales in order to manipulate the market in
a stock or act profitably on inside information.
Nonetheless, all of the above concerns must be
weighed against a large number of studies (starting
with Miller 1977 and Diamond and Verecchia 1987),
which indicate that short selling is an important factor
with respect to:
• efficient price discovery (inter alia, Bris et al.
2007), because it allows all buying and selling
interest in the market to be revealed and be bet-
ter reflected into prices. Also short selling ensures
a more rapid re-pricing of over-valued securities
than would otherwise be the case;
• controlling over-pricing4 (price bubbles), because
it helps “contrarian investors” to mitigate,
through rapid sales, steep, temporary price spikes
(mini “bubbles”); and 
• increasing market liquidity and facilitating hedg-
ing and other risk management activities. In the
absence of restrictions on short selling, short
traders and their counterparties find it easier to
trade. This translates to a bigger number of trad-
ing parties for a specific stock, higher trading vol-
ume, and lower bid-ask spreads, boosting liquidi-
ty and facilitating hedging strategies.
Traditionally, the regulatory treatment of short sales
has been either hesitantly heavy-handed, such as the
US uptick rule under Rule 10a-1, which, in a modi-
fied form, was in force since 1938 and was repealed
in July 2007, or fretfully relaxed, relying on convo-
luted disclosure arrangements of stock-lending data,
as was the case for the UK regime (FSA 2002). The
watershed moment in the regulation of short selling
was the market price collapse of financial sector
stocks, following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
and the publication of the financial troubles of
American International Group (AIG), in the first
two weeks of September 2008. The collapse of
Lehman Brothers not only underscored the depth of
the financial distress that financial services firms
faced at the time, but also the US government’s
unwillingness to see all banks as “too big to fail”.
This signalled to creditors and shareholders of finan-
cial firms that there was a strong possibility of seri-
ous losses in their investments. As a result, stock
markets witnessed in September 2008 a massive in-
crease of short selling orders for financial sector
stocks. That surge in short selling interest was casti-
gated as the main reason for the amplification of
downward price pressures in what was already a
falling market.
Heeding the public backlash against short selling,
stroked by the press, and under strong pressure by
governments and financial sector firms and share-
holders, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and
most European and other developed market regula-
tors issued orders banning short selling in financial
sector firms,5 which came into effect on 21 Septem-
ber 2009. However, the global ban was more of a
“knee-jerk” reaction to the precipitous price falls
and less a comprehensive regulatory response to the
challenges posed by short selling. As a result, the rel-
evant regulatory orders presented several loopholes
and were rather asymmetric, both in their reach and
exemptions, causing distortions to cross-border secu-
rities trading. For instance, the FSA’s ban covered
short-selling positions accumulated through the use
of derivatives6 but the SEC’s did not.
The vexed issue of short-sales regulation
It is not surprising that the regulation of short sales
has always been a vexed issue and regulators have
not so far found an effective way to deal with this
practice. Yet the September 2008 prohibitions pro-
vided the opportunity to empirically test the results
of restrictions on short selling and the results were
overwhelmingly not in favour of prohibition. Studies
of the ban’s impact on US and UK markets have
shown that short selling was not the main driver of
the precipitous price falls in financial sector stocks
(Office of Economic Analysis 2008; FSA 2009;
3 The phrase was coined by Keynes to describe the impact of opti-
mism (i.e., over-confidence/exuberance) on economic decision-
making. It has, however, evolved to describe all forms of economic
decisions based on sentiment (Keynes 1936, 144).
4 E.g., Jones and Lamont (2002) found that stocks that are expen-
sive to short or to enter the borrowing market have high valuations
and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing
hypothesis.
5 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58592 (18 September
2008; “Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to
Respond to Market Developments”); FSA, Short Selling (No 2)
Instrument 2008 (relating to UK Financial Sector companies), FSA
2008/50 (18 September 2008).
6 There are various derivative instruments which allow investors to
take a short position in a particular security in order to hedge or
speculate. Use of these derivatives generally results in a short sale
of the related securities further down the chain of transactions in
order to hedge the position.
Boehmer et al. 2008). The FSA’s study on the impact
of its own ban also showed that the prohibition
brought very little benefit in terms of price stability
and had an adverse impact on liquidity (FSA 2009;
also Clifton and Snape 2008).Arguably, other factors
such as news about a very serious deterioration in
the quality of bank assets due to the ongoing credit
crisis, the developing economic crisis, de-leveraging
by hedge funds and other investors, and genuine
market panic, amplified by strategic trade behaviour
(so-called herding; Scharfstein and Stein 1990) had a
much bigger impact on falling prices than increased
volumes of short selling.
Furthermore, while short sales may be implicated in
market abuse, this is usually an implementing strate-
gy in the context of wider schemes to manipulate the
market by spreading false rumours. It is thus the lat-
ter area which regulatory efforts should concentrate
on. Only “naked” short sales and short sales before
seasoned offerings have the potential to manipulate
market prices without the aid of false rumours
(Lecce et al. 2008). However, regulators have at their
disposal a multitude of other means to protect the
market against market manipulation without elimi-
nating the liquidity and information and pricing effi-
ciency benefits that short-selling seems to bring on
many occasions. Therefore, the market abuse argu-
ment is an unconvincing rationale for banning short
sales. Arguably, extensive disclosure, short-trading
halts, in the case of highly precipitous market price
falls, and strict penalties for non-settlement, may be
sufficient to contain the adverse impact of these
practices without banning short sales (London Stock
Exchange Group 2009).
Given the failure of the September 2008 short-sales
ban to curb market volatility, the vexed issue of
short-selling regulation still calls for a well-designed
and far-reaching solution which would also lead to
symmetric/compatible national short-selling regimes.
Most developed market regulators, including the
SEC7 and the FSA have consulted on the best way to
regulate short selling. Moreover, since the asymmet-
ric/incompatible nature of the earlier national prohi-
bitions created impediments to cross-border trading
of securities, the most important international regu-
latory networks for securities markets: the Commis-
sion of European Securities Regulators (CESR
2008) and the International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions (IOSCO 2009) have also con-
sulted on the most suitable regulatory treatment of
short selling.
A global framework for the regulation of short
sales
Regulation governing short sales must allow the liq-
uidity and information benefits of short selling to
accrue, preventing, at the same time, extreme specu-
lation that destabilises the market. Also, it must cre-
ate a transparent market that allows traders to have
information on the volume of short sales with
respect to a tradeable stock and its potential price
impact.8
However, a regulatory strategy that merely focuses
on disclosure will provide unsatisfactory results. The
presence in the market of “noise” traders and of seri-
ous transaction costs (actual stock purchases) means
that arbitrage trading on the demand side may not
materialise in such a quantity as to provide a coun-
terbalance to the downwards price trends initiated
by sizeable short sales.
The apparent inability of the market to provide sta-
bilisers to unnecessary downwards price movements
will trigger further sales due to herding, and profes-
sional investors are likely to join the herd amplifying
downward pressures. Hence, the need for a circuit
breaker halt rule that operates on the basis of a
sophisticated price threshold, in order to keep in
“check” the destructive “animal spirits”, preventing
price falls from destabilising the market. Therefore, a
combination of properly calibrated disclosure
requirements for short sales and of sophisticated cir-
cuit breaker trading halts would be sufficient to con-
trol the undesirable effects of short selling. When this
two-pronged strategy is complemented by a strict set-
tlement regime, it may protect issuers of securities
and the market from the undesirable consequences of
heavy short selling that destabilises the market, with-
out eliminating the efficiency benefits of short sales.
The circuit breaker halt rule that stops short trading
on the stock concerned for the rest of the trading day
– if the market price falls below a certain threshold –
must be a much more sophisticated mechanism than
the one proposed by the SEC9 and should not be
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8 Increased disclosure also creates an information barrier to the
successful implementation of designs to manipulate the market.
9 SEC Release No. 34-59748.
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part of general circuit breaker mechanisms, as the
FSA’s paper implicitly suggests. First, relevant sys-
tems must identify whether there is a negative cor-
porate announcement affecting prices. Next, in the
absence of such an announcement, they should as-
certain whether there is an absolute increase in the
volume of short sales. Once the second test is met,
then, the third test examining falls in the market
price should be triggered. The price test should refer
to a percentage fall in the market price as compared
to a weighted average price comprising the previous
day’s closing price, which should be assigned the
biggest weight, the average closing price of the pre-
ceding week, and the average closing price of the
preceding month, which is assigned the lowest
weight. Setting the price threshold as a percentage
fall over a weighted average would allow the circuit
breaker to capture market trends that extend be-
yond a day’s trading and thus be more restrictive of
sudden price falls, possibly caused by a “wild” swing
in investor sentiment. It would also allow the circuit
breaker system to be less restrictive in the case of
market price falls that are closer to market expecta-
tions over a short and medium-term period.
Moreover, in order to take into account actual dif-
ferences in price fluctuations of very liquid, less liq-
uid, and relatively illiquid stocks, and facilitate the
implementation, through symmetric national regula-
tions, of an effective global regime governing short
sales, the price threshold should be set at the same
level (e.g., 10 percent fall of the weighted average
price) for all stocks belonging to the main indices of
developed markets, e.g., FTSE 350, S&P 500, Nikkei
500, regardless of the country of issuer’s incorpora-
tion. Another uniform threshold should apply to
lower cap stocks that are not part of the main index
of a developed market and stocks traded in develop-
ing markets. Admittedly stocks participating in one
of the major market indices are much more liquid
and less prone to wild price swings than stocks that
belong in small cap market indices or stocks traded
on developing markets. The same uniform principles
may be applied to thresholds triggering the disclo-
sure of short positions as part of local regulations.
The suggested strategy for the regulation of short sales
is easily transferable from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
allowing IOSCO and CESR to build standards and
rules, which, may lead, through national implementa-
tion, to symmetric local regimes governing short sales.
Therefore, it may be used as the foundation of a new
global framework for the regulation of short sales that
would eliminate the obstacles to cross-border trading
created by the current regulatory asymmetry. As a re-
sult, costs of compliance and other costs of cross-bor-
der equity trading would be lowered.
The introduction of symmetric or harmonised national
short-selling regimes in order to lower the costs of
cross-border equity trading is a very pressing request
of large institutional investors with international pres-
ence. Finally, a combination of lower costs of equity
trading and reduced possibilities of overpricing, which
is countered by legalisation of short-selling activity,
essentially translates into lower cost of capital.The cost
of capital is, of course, a very important factor with
respect to access to capital and capital investment, both
essential ingredients of economic growth.
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